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The federal government鈥檚 newly released听听is hugely disappointing, but far from surprising. It does not depart from what the Turnbull government has been saying for some time: it plans to loosen compliance obligations for emissions-intensive companies even further, reintroduce international carbon offsets, and implement the planned听.

The review was first announced November 2016, when Australia听, committing it to a听. A year later, the final report claims that Australia is on track to meet this target with its existing climate change policies.

The review indicates plans to keep the听, a A$2.55 billion pot of public money from which companies can bid for funding to implement emissions reductions. But it does not promise new funding beyond the existing A$2.55 billion, nor does it address听听听with the scheme.

The Climate Policy Review is also not surprising because it continues a longstanding, bipartisan tradition in weak climate policy formulation. It echoes four enduring features of Australia鈥檚 ineffective climate policy since the 1990s. We can think of them as a recipe for business as usual.

Step 1: Pursue a weak emissions target.

Australia鈥檚 2020 and 2030 emissions targets are听. The 2020 target of reducing emissions by 5% below 2000 levels (a reduction equivalent to 294 million tonnes of carbon dioxide) will be met largely on the back of a听when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated.

The Turnbull government ratified the听听in 2016, having pledged to听. The review provides no clear answer as to how the 2030 target will be met. However, there are signs that domestic emissions will continue to rise, and that international carbon offsets will have to be bought to 鈥渂alance鈥� the national carbon account.

Step 2: Loosen obligations for industry as much as possible.

Weak compliance obligations for industry are the reason why emissions may rise in the future. The review signals changes to the听听鈥� a key plank of its existing听听policy suite, which aims to encourages large businesses not to exceed their historical emissions levels.

The problem is that the听听is already weak, and only covers around 140 of Australia鈥檚 most emissions-intensive firms.

The Safeguard Mechanism requires companies to report on their emissions against an historical baseline rate. If they exceed this baseline, they can meet their obligations by buying carbon credits. The baseline is already听. For instance, companies can ask for their baseline to be recalculated if their overall emissions have increased but their emissions intensity (the amount of emissions per unit of economic productivity) has improved.

The Climate Policy Review says the government plans to increase this flexibility still further, and will work with industry to change baseline calculations. It makes the bizarre argument that the problem with baselines is that they reflect the historical activity of businesses which might be emitting more today if they increase production to remain competitive.

The proposed solution? 鈥淏roaden access to baseline increases鈥�, which could mean the government plans to rewrite baseline rules to ensure companies are not obliged to reduce their emissions if their production grows. This goes against the very grain of climate policy, which should be to encourage high-emitting companies to change how they do business.

Of course, this isn鈥檛 the first time a government has sought to be generous to emissions-intensive industries. The Keating and Howard governments made emissions reduction schemes entirely voluntary.

The Rudd and Gillard governments also invented similar loopholes to the one suggested by the new review. Both Rudd鈥檚 proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme and Gillard鈥檚 carbon pricing scheme included incredibly generous听听to the most emissions-intensive industries in the form of free permits and cash payments. These were听听on the basis of international competition.

Step 3: Shift the heavy lifting elsewhere.

The review signals a return to another policy tactic to avoid cutting emissions in the domestic economy. In a major departure from the Abbott government鈥檚 position, the current review embraces once again the idea of buying international carbon credits.

Carbon offsets have been a longstanding part of Australian climate policy, dating back to early reports on emissions trading听. More recently, the Howard government鈥檚听听and the听听both argued for international offsets as a source of 鈥渇lexibility鈥�.

Carbon credits are generated from projects that propose to reduce emissions, usually in industries and places not covered by national emissions trading schemes. In Australia, they are produced mostly in the land sector under the Emissions Reduction Fund, while globally these projects have been centred on China, India, Brazil, and听.

The idea behind these projects is that they deliver 鈥渁dditional鈥� emissions reductions that would not have happened without the investment from those buying the carbon credits. In reality it鈥檚听. Carbon offsets shift the hard work away from industries and countries that should really be working the hardest 鈥� such as Australia鈥檚 electricity sector.

By offshoring the heavy lifting, governments delay real, meaningful change in cutting emissions. Federal Environment and Energy Minister Josh Frydenberg summed up the false logic of international carbon offsetting in his听:

• "When it comes to helping the environment, it doesn鈥檛 matter if you鈥檝e reduced a tonne of CO鈧� here in Australia or in another country."

But it does matter. Sure, carbon offsetting allows flexibility in the short term, but it makes it much harder in the long term to move away from fossil fuels if we鈥檙e not investing in renewable energy infrastructure right now.

Step 4: Act as if it鈥檚 out of the question for governments to plan and build a low-carbon economy.

The听听(NEG) requires electricity retailers to buy or generate electricity at or below a particular emissions intensity. The government is fond of telling us how the policy is 鈥渢echnology-neutral鈥�, replacing the Renewable Energy Target which specifically encouraged low-carbon energy investments.

The details of how the NEG will be designed are still sketchy, but it is likely to take the form of a sort of market mechanism.

Market mechanisms will do little in the absence of structural change in the听. The history of energy infrastructure development in Australia and across the globe tells us that concerted planning and public investment is essential for energy transformations.

Meanwhile, the more recent political and practical听听show that a techno-market fix will not 鈥渟olve鈥� climate politics for the current or future governments.

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This article was originally published on . It was authored by from the Department of Political Economy.听